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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Steven Kenneth Bowman appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to felony possession of methamphetamine, contending the 
district court erred in denying his motion to suppress. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Bowman with possession of methamphetamine and 
possession of drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.7-8, 30-31, 34-35.) The state also 
filed an Information Part II alleging Bowman is a persistent violator. (R., pp.43-
44.) Bowman filed a motion to suppress. (R., pp.73, 79-85.) The district court 
held a suppression hearing after which it denied Bowman's motion. (See 
generally Supp. Hrg. Tr.; R., pp.134-148.) 
On the day of trial, the parties reached an agreement in which Bowman 
entered a conditional guilty plea 1 to the possession of methamphetamine charge, 
reserving the right to appeal the denial of his suppression motion; the state 
dismissed the paraphernalia charge and withdrew the Information Part II. 
(Change of Plea Tr., p.5, Ls.4-19, p.21, L.16 - p.25, L.6; R., p.155.) The court 
imposed a unified seven-year sentence with two and one-half years fixed. (R., 
pp.157-159.) Bowman filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.164-166.) 
1 Bowman's guilty plea was also entered pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 
400 U.S. 25 (1970). (Change of Plea Tr., p.5, Ls.12-14, p.6, Ls.12-24.) 
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ISSUE 
Bowman states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Bowman's motion to 
suppress. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.10.) 
The state wishes to rephrase the issue on appeal as follows: 




Bowman Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His 
Suppression Motion 
A. Introduction 
Bowman argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to 
suppress. A review of the applicable law, the evidence presented at the 
suppression hearing, and the district court's factual findings and conclusions of 
law support the district court's decision to deny Bowman's request for 
suppression. 
B. Standard Of Review 
'"[D]eterminations of reasonable suspicion and probable cause should be 
reviewed de novo on appeal."' State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 127, 233 P.3d 52, 58 
(2010) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (brackets 
original)). "[l]n conducting that review the appellate court 'should take care both 
to review findings of historical fact only for clear error and to give due weight to 
inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law enforcement 
officers."' ~ The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual 
conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. 
State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. 
Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999). The appellate 
court also gives deference to any implicit findings of the trial court supported by 
substantial evidence. State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 218, 984 P.2d 703, 706 
(1999). 
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C. Bowman Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Suppression 
Motion 
A traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and, 
because it is limited in scope and duration, "it is analogous to an investigative 
detention and is analyzed under the principles set forth" in Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. (1968). State v. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 889, 187 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ct. 
App. 2008) (citations omitted). "[T]raffic stops must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." State v. Henage, 
143 Idaho 658, 663, 152 P.3d 16, 19 (2007) (citation and quotations omitted). 
"There is no rigid time limit for determining when a detention has lasted longer 
than necessary; rather, a court must consider the scope of the detention and the 
law enforcement purposes to be served, as well as the duration of the stop." 
State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(citations omitted). The court must also consider whether the officer's 
observations during the encounter "and events succeeding the stop" gave rise to 
"legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further investigation" 
which justified expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. kL see also 
State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 2001). In 
addition, it is well-settled that law enforcement may deploy a drug dog to sniff the 
exterior of a lawfully stopped vehicle without suspicion of drug activity so long as 
doing so does not prolong the detention beyond what is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005); State v. 
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Wigginton, 142 Idaho 180, 183-84, 125 P.3d 536, 539-40 (Ct. App. 2005); State 
v. Parkinson, 135 Idaho 357, 363, 17 P.3d 301, 307 (Ct. App. 2000). 
Law enforcement may constitutionally search an individual's car without a 
warrant if there is "probable cause to believe the vehicle contains contraband or 
evidence of a crime." State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 706, 302 P.3d 328, 331 
(2012) (citation omitted). "Probable cause is established when the totality of the 
circumstances known to the officer at the time of the search would give rise-in 
the mind of a reasonable person-to a fair probability that contraband or 
evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place." kl "Probable cause is a 
flexible, common-sense standard, and a practical, nontechnical probability that 
incriminating evidence is present is all that is required." & (citing Texas v. 
Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 742 (1983)). Law enforcement may also conduct a 
warrantless search of a car incident to the arrest of an occupant of the car "when 
it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest or 
when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at 
the time of the search." State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,118,266 P.3d 1220, 
1223 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 349-353 (2009)). 
The sequence of events giving rise to the criminal charges against 
Bowman began with a traffic stop of a vehicle in which Bowman was a 
passenger, although he was the registered owner of the vehicle. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.9, Ls.1-13, p.11, Ls.10-17.) The traffic stop occurred at 12:18 a.m. and was 
made because the vehicle's registration was cancelled. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.8, 
Ls.1-3, p.9, Ls.1-8.) The driver of the vehicle had a suspended license and was 
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arrested on an outstanding warrant. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.17, Ls.16-19, p.19, Ls.7-
19.) Although Bowman had a valid license, he could not drive the car following 
the driver's arrest because the registration was cancelled. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.17, 
Ls.20-25, p.20, Ls.11-13.) Officer David Jones testified he intended to write 
Bowman a citation.2 (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.20, Ls.7-10.) 
When Officer Jones' partner, Officer Tad Miller, called dispatch to check 
for warrants, he also requested a K-9 unit. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.20, L.23 - p.21, 
L.2.) Officer Steven Bonas responded to the request with his dog, Ruwa. (Supp. 
Hrg. Tr., p.21, Ls.3-7, p.107, Ls.10-12, p.108, Ls.7-8, p.120, L.19 - p.121, L.7.) 
Once Officer Bonas and Ruwa arrived, Officer Jones had Bowman get out of the 
car because "as a general matter," law enforcement removes all occupants from 
a car prior to deploying a K-9. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.21, Ls.11-18.) After Bowman 
got out of the car, Officer Jones frisked Bowman for weapons. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.22, L.23 - p.23, L.8.) Officer Jones testified that he performed the frisk based 
upon his "knowledge and experience," the circumstances, and the fact that 
Bowman told him he "had gun weapon charges as well as drug charges in his 
past." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.15, L.22 - p.16, L.6, p.23, Ls.9-21; see also p.25, Ls.12-
15 ("I explain[ed] to him because of prior weapons charges and his history that I 
was going to pat search, make sure he didn't have any weapons.").) Both Officer 
Jones and Officer Miller also testified that Bowman was unusually nervous, and 
2 At the suppression hearing, Officer Jones testified that Bowman was not 
wearing a seat belt and did not believe Bowman had insurance. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.20, Ls.1-6.) When asked if he intended to write Bowman a citation "for at least 
some of these infractions," Officer Jones answered, "Yes." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.20, 
Ls.7-10.) 
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Officer Jones testified that Bowman kept reaching around in the car even after he 
was told not to do so. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.12, L.12 - p.15, L.21, p.66, Ls.7-24.) 
During the frisk for weapons, Officer Jones asked Bowman if he had any 
weapons and Bowman "said he had a pocket knife on him." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.26, L.25 - p.27, L.3.) Bowman told Officer Jones the knife was in his coat 
pocket and Officer Jones removed it. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, Ls.4-11.) Also 
during the frisk, Officer Jones felt a "large hard object" in Bowman's pocket but 
could not tell what it was. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.27, L.24 - p.28, L.9.) When Officer 
Jones asked Bowman what it was, Bowman "said he didn't know." (Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.28, Ls.10-13.) Officer Jones testified that he asked Bowman if he could 
check what it was and Bowman agreed. (Supp. Hrg Tr., p.28, Ls.19-25.) Officer 
Jones pulled the item out and discovered it was a digital scale. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., 
p.30, Ls.9-12.) Although Officer Jones thought the scale was likely drug-related, 
because it was not a weapon, he put it back in Bowman's pocket.3 (Supp. Hrg. 
Tr., p.30, L.13 - p.31, L.4.) After the frisk, Officer Jones began filling out a 
citation. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.31, Ls.11-18.) 
After Ruwa did not alert on Bowman's car, Officer Bonas, who had seen 
Officer Jones discover the scale in Bowman's pocket, asked Bowman if he could 
see the scale. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.123, Ls.2-18, p.124, Ls.4-21, p.127, Ls.7-24.) 
Bowman said yes and gave the scale to Officer Bonas who inspected it with a 
flashlight. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.127, L.22 - p.128, L.9.) Officer Bonas "saw several 
3 Bowman said he used the scale to weigh letters he wrote to friends in prison so 
he could determine the proper amount of postage needed to mail the letters. 
(Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.76, Ls.4-18.) 
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white crystal . . particles" on the scale, and placed it on the ground and retrieved 
Ruwa and "[g]ave him the command to search." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.129, L.12 -
p.130, L.16.) Ruwa "started sniffing the area between the cars" and as Ruwa 
passed by the scale he "snap[ped] his head quickly to the right," and "started 
sniffing half inch above right on top of the scale." (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.130, Ls.13-
22.) Ruwa then "went into the sit position," indicating the scale had the odor of 
one of the drugs Ruwa was trained to detect. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.130, L.23 -
p.131, L.8.) As a result, Bowman was arrested for possession of paraphernalia 
and a subsequent search of Bowman's car incident to his arrest revealed 
additional drugs and paraphernalia under the passenger seat where Bowman 
had been sitting at the time of the traffic stop. (Supp. Hrg. Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32, 
L.3, p.79, Ls.3-24, p.81, Ls.4-24.) 
Although Bowman does not challenge the legality of the traffic stop, he 
claims, as he did below, that there were several Fourth Amendment violations 
during the stop. First, Bowman contends the frisk was unlawful because it was 
not based upon reasonable articulable suspicion to believe that he was armed 
and presently dangerous. (Appellant's Brief, pp.14-17.) Bowman also argues 
that his detention was unlawfully prolonged beyond the purpose of the original 
stop and without reasonable suspicion to extend the investigation. (Appellant's 
Brief, pp.19-25.) Next, Bowman asserts that his consent to allow Officer Bonas 
to see the scale was invalid. (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-29.) Finally, Bowman 
argues that the search of his car was "fruit of the poisonous tree." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.12; see also p.29.) 
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In its order denying Bowman's motion to suppress, the district court 
addressed all of Bowman's complaints and rejected each of them. (R., pp.134-
148.) In doing so, the court outlined the applicable legal standards, its factual 
findings, and its analysis of Bowman's claims. The court's order denying 
Bowman's suppression motion is attached hereto as Appendix A and the state 
adopts the court's analysis for purposes of appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment of 
conviction entered upon Bowman's conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine. 
DATED this 14th day of January 2015. . () _f 
(~~1vy 
JE$SI¢A M. LORELLO 
De~ Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 14th day of January 2015, served a 
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a 
copy addressed to: 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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Currently before the Court is defendant Bowman's motion to suppress, filed August 20, 
2013. The state filed its opposition brief on September 18, 2013, and a split evidentiary hearing 
;' was held on September 20, 2013, and October 4, 2013, to accommodate the schedules of the 
, · state's witnes.ses. Jl1e State submitted supplemental opposition briefing on October 10, 2013, 
and the def~nd~t submitted his supplemental brief on October 11, 2013, in response to the 
Court's direction to the parties to address an issue raised clearly for the first time at the hearing 
(the reasonableness of the duration of the traffic stop that led to the discovery of contraband). 
The Court has now read and considered the parties' briefing and related materials, and has heard 
oral argument and the testimony of key witnesses, and has reviewed other evidence produced at 
the hearing. Accordingly, it now issues the following memorandum decision and order denying 
the defendant's motion to suppress. 
I. BACKGROUND 
On April 11, 2013, Defendant Bowman was arraigned on a single felony count of 
Possession of a Controlled Substance and a single misdemeanor count of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia The charges, and the primary evidence supporting them, arose from a traffic stop 
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of Bowman's vehicle executed by officers Tad Miller and D~an Jones of the Boise City Police 
Department at approximately 12:15 A.M. on the evening of February 1, 2013. The initial 
justification for the stop was that the officers determined, while on routine patrol in the 
neighborhood of Vista and Elder in Boise, Idaho, that the registration on the vehicle in which 
defendant was a passenger had been cancelled. The defendant, despite being the passenger of the 
vehicle, was the vehicle's owner. 
The basic chronology of relevant events is undisputed in this case. In short, the 
aforementioned officers pulled over a green Cadillac shortly after midnight on February 1, 2013, 
for cancelled registration. The driver of the vehicle was one Kayla Martinez, and the passenger 
was the defendant. Martinez pulled over in a motel parking lot, and officer Jones spoke to the 
defendant while officer Miller spoke to Martinez. Both officers had various opportunities to 
observe the defendant throughout the traffic stop, and the balance of their testimony both at the 
preliminary hearing and at the suppression hearing was that the defendant appeared unusually 
nervous, even for the circumstances, as indicated by his accelerated breathing rate and rubbing of 
his hands on his pants. There was also testimony that the defendant had to be repeatedly told not 
to reach around his car and exhibited nervous, repeated behaviors, chiefly redundant searches of 
paperwork in the car's glovebox. Officer Jones also observed that the defendant was not wearing 
his seatbelt. During this period, the defendant disclosed that he had prior arrests and/or 
convictions for drug and weapon offenses. 
During this initial portion of the stop, the officers determined that Martinez had an active 
warrant, and removed her from the car and placed her into custody. They also determined that 
the defendant would be cited for the seatbelt violation, and based upon his unusual nervousness 
and his disclosed prior history of drug and weapons offenses, opted to remove the defendant from 
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the car and conduct a weapons frisk of his person while Martinez was being restrained and a ,K.9 
unit was being dispatched to the scene. It appears from the evidence produced at the hea..'ing that 
the K9 unit was dispatched only a few minutes into the stop and arrived at the scene 
approximately ten minutes after being requested. 
Officer Jones conducted the weapons frisk of the defendant while the K.9 officer, officer 
Bonas, ran his canine around the car. The defendant disclosed that he had a knife, and officer 
Jones took possession of it. During the course of the pat-down search, the defendant declined to 
give officer Miller permission to search his car. Shortly after the defendant refused to consent to 
the search of his vehicle, officer Jones discovered an unknown object in the defendant's pocket. 
Jones asked the defendant what the object was, and the defendant replied that he did not know. 
Jones then asked if he could examine the object, and the defendant stated that he could. The 
object was a digital scale.' When Jones asked why he had the scale, the defendant stated he had it 
for "lettering" (which he later clarified to mean that he used the scale to weigh mail to determine 
the required postage). The scale was returned to the defendant's possession, and no other 
weapons or contraband was found on his person. Further, officer Bonas' dog did not alert on the 
outside of the car. 
At this point in time, officer Bonas asked the defendant if he could examine the scale. 
The defendant again produced the scale upon the officer's request, and officer Bonas testified 
that he could see minute crystals of what appeared to be drug residue on its surface. He then 
placed the scale on the ground and directed the canine to sniff the scale. The canine then alerted 
on the scale, and the officers told the defendant that he could consent to the search of the car, or 
be placed under arrest for possession of drug paraphernalia. The defendant again declined to 
authorize the search of the car, and was then placed under arrest. The officers then searched the 
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interior of the defendant's vehicle, and officer Miller found a black bag under the front passenger 
seat containing what appeared to be additional drug paraphernalia as well as what appeared to be 
drug residue. 
In total, the defendant raises four grounds in support of his motion to suppress the scale 
and the additional evidence found in the car: 1) that no reasonable basis existed for officers to 
conduct a pat-down search of.his person for weapons; 2) that he did not validly consent to the 
officers' taking possession of the scale in the course of the frisk; 3) that no valid exception to the 
search warrant requirement existed to justify the warrantless search of his car; and 4) that the 
traffic stop was unreasonably and unjustifiably extended in duration after the drug dog failed to 
alert on the car as a pretext to manufacture a basis for searching the interior of the vehicle for 
contraband. The Court will first articulate the legal standards applicable to the motion, and then 
will address each of the issues raised by the defendant in turn. 
IT.LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. PROBABLE CAUSE AND EXCEPTIONS TO THEW ARRANT 
REQUIREMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF VEHICLE STOPS. The Fourth Amendment of 
the United States Constitution and similar provisions in the Idaho Constitution prohibit 
unreasonable search and seizure of persons and their property. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Idaho 
Const. art. I,§ 17. When evidence is obtained in violation of the defendant's rights, "the 
judicially developed exclusionary rule usually precludes its use in a criminal proceeding against 
the victim of the illegal search and seizure." Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 337-38 (2009). 
Where a vehicle is stopped, it is a "seizure" of the vehicle's occupants within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411,417 (1981). For a vehicle stop to be 
lawful, police must first have reasonable suspicion or probable cause that the occupants are 
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engaged in criminal activity. See id In determining whether reasonable suspicion or probable 
cause exists, "[a]t a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of ·witnesses, resolve 
factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court." State v. 
Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,106,897 P.2d 993,997 (1995). Probable cause is a "flexible, 
common-sense standard" intended to establish whether the officer knows, at the inception of the 
search, of "objective facts which would be sufficient to convince a magistrate to issue a warrant 
under similar circumstances." State v. Veneroso, 138 Idaho 925,929, 71 P.3d 1072, 1076 (Ct. 
App. 2003). Facts sufficient to convince the officer, in light of his expertise and experience, of a 
"practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is present" satisfies this standard. 
Id; see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050, 1055 (2013) (noting that "[a]ll we have required 
[for probable cause J is the kind of 'fair probability' on which 'reasonable and prudent [people,] 
not legal technicians, act," and rejecting the imposition of "finely tuned standards" upon police 
officers by courts assessing the existence of probable cause.) 
"While warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable .... the state may 
overcome this presumption by demonstrating that a warrantless search either fell within a well-
rec?gnized exception to the warrant requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the 
circumstances." Veneroso at 929, 71 P.3d at 1076. One such well-recognized exception, the 
"automobile exception," enables officers to "search an automobile and the containers within it 
where they have probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband or evidence 
of a crime." Id. (citing to State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 898, 821 P.2d 949, 953 (1991)). 
Another is the search of a vehicle incident to a lawful arrest. State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115,118, 
266 P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011). In the latter case, "authorities may only search a vehicle 
incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of 
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arrest or when the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time 
of the search." Id. The fact that a defendant has not been formally arrested at the time of the 
search does not invalidate the exception where the officer had probable cause to arrest the 
defendant at the time of the search, and the search and the arrest are "substantially 
contemporaneous" in time. Id. 
B. INVESTIGATORY DETENTIONS-TERRY STOPS AND FRISKS. As noted 
previously, a warrantless search is deemed to be "unreasonable" per se unless it falls within one 
of the specifically established and well-delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. State v. 
Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 726, 701 P.2d 671, 674 (Ct.App.1985) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576, 585 (1967)). One such exception was 
established by the United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 24, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 
1881, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 907 ( 1968), in which the Court held that a police officer who has 
justifiably detained a person for investigation of possible criminal activity may also frisk the 
individual for the officer's own safety if the officer reasonably believes that the person may be 
armed and dangerous. See also Zapp, 108 Idaho at 726, 701 P.2d at 674. 
fuMichigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the 
Supreme Court held that a Terry frisk may include protective searches of automobiles for 
weapons. However, the Court limited warrantless searches to situations in which an "officer 
possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 
the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer to believe that the suspect 
is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons .... [T]he issue is whether 
a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or 
that of others was in danger." Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 103 S.Ct. at 3480-81, 77 L.Ed.2d at 
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1219-20 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d at 909). In making the 
determination of whether the officers had a "reasonable belief' of danger, the court looks "to the 
facts known to the officers on the scene and the inferences of risk of danger reasonably dra'WIJ. 
from the totality of those specific circumstances." State v. Jv.fuir, 116 Idaho 565,567, 777 P.2d 
1238, 1240 (Ct.App.1989). 
C. DURATION OF TRAFFIC STOP. Where a person is detained, the scope of 
detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325-26, 75 L.Ed.2d 229,238 (1983). An investigative detention 
must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Id. 
However, a police officer may run a drug dog around a stopped vehicle if the use of the drug dog 
does not lengthen the duration of the detention. State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 563, 112 P.3d 
848, 851 (Ct. App. 2005). Furthermore, a police officer may ask questions unrelated to the stop 
so long as the questioning does not lengthen the duration of the stop. State v. Parkinson, 135 
Idaho 357, 362-63, 17 P.3d 301, 306-07 (Ct. App. 2000). 
D. VOLUNTARINESS OF CONSENT TO SEARCH. Valid consent is also a well-
recognized exception to the search warrant requirement. State v. Stewart, 145 Idaho 641, 644, 
181 P.3d 1249, 1252 (Ct. App. 2008). When consent is cited by the state as the basis for a 
warrantless search, the state must show by a preponderance of the evidence "that the consent was 
voluntary rather than the result of duress or coercion, direct or implied." Id. at 64 7, 181 P .3d at 
1255. "[W]hether consent was granted voluntarily, or was a product of coercion, is a factual 
determination to be based upon the surrounding circumstances, accounting for subtly coercive 
police questions and the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the party granting the consent to a 
search." Id. at 648, 181 P.3d at 1256. Among those factors relevant to consent are the number of 
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officers on the scene, the physical and temporal dimensions of the encounter (including whether 
it occurred at night), whether police retained the suspect's identification, whether the suspect was 
free to leave, and whether the suspect knew he could refuse consent. Id There is no requirement 
that the police inform the suspect that he is free to leave or that he may withhold his consent. Id 
Further, consent obtained in the course of an illegal detention is invalid, however informed or 
voluntary it otherwise may appear to be. Id. at 644, 181 P.3d at 1252. 
ID.ANALYSIS 
Here, the Court concludes that although police undoubtedly used sharp investigative 
tactics in order to lead the defendant along a path leading to his arrest and the search of his 
vehicle, and to the contraband found inside it, officers never strayed beyond the confines of the 
law in doing so, and hence the motion to suppress must be denied. 
A. THE TERRY FRISK OF THE DEFENDANT WAS JUSTIFIED BY THE 
OFFICERS' REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE DEFENDANT MIGHT BE ARMED 
AND DANGEROUS. The relevant testimony from officers Jones and Miller is uncontroverted, 
and adequately supports their decision to perform a pat-down search of the defendant for 
weapons. This testimony, as recounted above, is that the defendant exhibited a degree of 
nervousness that significantly exceeded that which the officers normally observed in similar 
situations; that is, he repeatedly reached around the inside of the vehicle despite warnings not to 
do so, conducted repetitious searches of documents in the glovebox of the car, and rubbed his 
legs repeatedly. Further, in the course of the initial conversation between officer Jones and the 
defendant, the defendant disclosed a history of drug and weapons charges. To be sure, the 
defendant was compliant and polite in his responses to questions, but the totality of the 
circumstances, in this Court's view, is sufficient to justify the officers' decision to direct the 
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defendant to exit the vehicle to conduct a pat-down search for weapons while the detention ran 
its course. Further (although this evidence could not justL.+y the search if it were not already 
justified by a reasonable belief that the defendant might be armed) the defendant did, in fact, 
have a weapon on his person ( a knife), which he disclosed after exiting the vehicle. In sum, this 
Court finds that the officers' decision to conduct a pat-down search of the defendant was justified 
by a reasonable belief that the defendant might be armed and dangerous. 
B. THE DEFENDANT VALIDLY CONSENTED TO ALLOW OFFICERS JO1'1ES 
AND, LATER, OFFICER BONAS TO EXAMINE THE DIGITAL SCALE FOUND ON 
HIS PERSON. As noted above, it is uncontroverted that when Officer Jones' frisk of the 
defendant revealed an unknown object in the defendant's pocket, he asked the defendant whether 
he could examine the object, and the defendant replied that he could. It is further uncontroverted 
that only a few moments before, the defendant had denied permission to officer Miller to search 
the interior of his car. 
Nevertheless, the defendant argues that his will was overborn by the number of officers 
on the scene (three plus the dog), the presence of the K9 unit, the fact that it was late at night, and 
by Officer Jones "attitude." These arguments are well-taken, and the Court has considered these 
factors in examining the totality of the circumstances in which the defendant found himself at the 
time. However, the Court cannot find that the defendant's consent to officer Jones was impliedly 
coerced as a result of these conditions. While it is true that there were multiple officers on the 
scene, this fact alone is not dispositive, and it must be remembered that officers had two subjects 
to contend with, not merely the defendant. 1bree officers to manage two persons very late at 
night is not an unusual ratio, even if one of the officers arrived in a separate police car with a 
drug-detection dog in tow. Undoubtedly, the presence of the K9 unit added to the stress of the 
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encounter for the defendant, but this fact alone is also insufficient to demonstrate that his will 
was overborne. Moreover, while the audio of the stop played at the hearing shows that officer 
Jones' "attitude" in his conversation with the defendfu'lt did sometimes convey overtones of 
authority (mostly while the defendant was still seated in the car and had to be repeatedly warned 
not to reach around the interior) on the whole, and particularly with regard to his questions 
concerning the scale, his tone was conversational and polite. Vvhile Officer Jones did not 
explicitly inform the defendant that he could refuse to show him the scale, the question was 
posed in such a way that the defendant was clearly invited to refuse to consent if that was his 
desire. 
Importantly, as the state points out, there can be no real doubt that the defendant actually 
understood that he could freely deny Officer Jones permission to retrieve the then-unidentified 
object in his pocket, for he had exercised that very right in regard to a request from Officer Miller 
to search the interior of the vehicle made only a very short time prior to the question from Officer 
Jones. Further, it is undisputed that the defendant had a significant criminal record, indicating he 
was at least somewhat familiar with the criminal justice system and his rights. The Court also 
notes that the defendant was by all accounts fully sober and aware of the circumstances at the 
time of the stop, meaning that there was no obvious cognitive impediment to his ability to put his 
knowledge of his rights to use, as he in fact did with respect to the request by Officer Miller to 
search his car. 
Given the totality of these circumstances, the Court concludes that the state has met its 
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant voluntarily consented 
to allow Officer Jones to retrieve and examine the digital scale, and such consent, being 
voluntary, was not the product of duress or coercion, direct or implied·. Although the validity of 
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the defendant's later consent to allow Officer Bonas to again examine the scale is not directly 
raised by the defendant, the Court for these reasons also makes the same finding with regard to 
that second instance of consent. 
C. THE DRUG-DETECTION DOG'S ALERT ON THE SCALE PROVIDED THE 
OFFICERS WITH PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE CAR FOR DRUG 
CONTRABAND UNDER THE VEHICLE EXCEPTION TO THEW ARRANT 
REQUIREMENT; ALTERNATIVELY, SINCE THE DEFENDANT WAS ARRESTED 
FOR A DRUG-RELATED CRIME, THEW ARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE CAR 
WAS AV ALID SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST. Under the automobile exception to the 
search warrant requirement, Officer Miller was justified in searching the interior of the vehicle 
without a warrant because the K9 unit's alert on the scale, along with the defendant's highly 
nervous demeanor, criminal history, refusal to consent to the search of the interior of the 
vehicle, 1 and frankly incredible statements about the scale, 2 gave the officer probable cause by 
that time to believe evidence of further drug activity would be found inside the car. Veneroso at 
929, 71 P.3d at 1076. 
1 Somewhat obviously, said refusal standing alone would not provide an officer with 
probable cause to conduct a warrantless search, or to enable him or her to obtain a 
search warrant. However, nothing in our law requires a police officer assessing the 
existence of probable cause to disregard a suspect's refusal to consent to such a 
search as one of the factors supporting the determination that probable cause exists. 
Florida v. Harris, 133 s.ct. 1050, 1055-56 (2013) ("All we have required [for a 
finding ·of probable cause] is the kind of 'fair probability' on which 'reasonable and 
~rudent [people,) not legal technicians, act.") 
Initially, when asked what the object in his pocket was, the defendant claimed that 
he did not know. After the scale was revealed for what it was, he claimed that he 
used it to weigh letters which he frequently mailed to prisoners for purposes of 
determining postage. These statements would defy belief even in a person without an 
established history of drug crime, and officers were entitled to exercise their common 
sense in order to disbelieve them and to consider the defendant's duplicity a factor 
in determining the existence of probable cause to search the car for drugs or drug 
paraphernalia. 
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That said, the state is not relying upon the automobile exception, but rather relies upon 
the exception for automobile searches incident to arrest, as it is uncontested that the defendant 
was arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia (the scale) prior to the search of the interior of 
the vehicle. Because the offense of arrest was drug-related, the officers were entitled to search 
the car for evidence related to drugs and drug paraphernalia, which they in fact discovered 
beneath the seat that had been occupied by the defendant. State v. Smith, 152 Idaho 115, 118, 266 
P.3d 1220, 1223 (Ct. App. 2011) (noting that "authorities may ... search a vehicle incident to 
arrest when it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of arrest .... ") 
There is no authority supporting the defendant's assertion that the dog's alert on the scale 
provided nothing more than probable cause to obtain a warrant, and, in fact, this assertion can be 
read as a concession by him that officers possessed the probable cause required under either of 
the exceptions just discussed, though it is not necessary to do so in order to sustain the result the 
Court reaches here. In short, this Court concludes that the warrantless search of the defendant's 
vehicle was justified under either the automobile exception or the exception for searches incident 
to arrest as argued by the state. 
D. OFFICERS DID NOT UNREASONABLY EXTEND THE DURATION OF 
THE STOP. The defendant does not contend that the initial pat-search of the defendant, which 
revealed the existence of the scale, itself caused the stop to be unreasonably delayed. He also 
does not argue that the stop was extended beyond the duration reasonable for a traffic stop to 
enable the K9 unit to arrive and sweep the exterior of the car. Rather, he argues that after the 
drug dog failed to alert on the car, officers should have terminated the stop and ceased further 
questioning of the defendant, because at that time they lacked any reasonable basis to continue 
the investigation. Had they done so, the defendant would not have produced the scale a second 
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time for Officer Bonas, the dog would not have alerted on the scale, and the defendant would not 
have been arrested or his car searched, resulting in the discovery of further drug contraband. 
The state correctly argued that this was a new theory for suppression raised only at oral 
argument and not briefed by the defendant, and hence the state was placed in an unfair position, 
having had no opportunity to prepare a proper response. The Court, perceiving the issue to be an 
important one, granted both parties additional time in which to brief the issue, which was done. 
Accordingly, the issue is now properly before the Court. 
The Court concludes that the stop was not unreasonably extended beyond the point at 
which the K9 unit failed to alert on the car. The parties, citing to Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 
4491, 50 (1983), State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913,916 (Ct.App. 2001), and State v. Myers, 118 
Idaho 608, 613 (Ct.App. 1990), agree that an investigative detention validly begun for one 
purpose may be continued for a different purpose if the initial investigation leads the officers to 
the reasonable belief that the new direction is warranted. Of course, all such investigative· 
detentions must be closely tailored to the purpose which it is intended to serve, being no more 
intrusive or lengthy than necessary. Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
The defendant's desire to draw the line demarcating a reasonable time period for officers 
to conduct their investigation of potential drug crime at the point at which the drug dog failed to 
alert on the car is understandable, but the Court is not persuaded, for the defendant's position 
understates the significance of the discovery of the scale to the question of what constitutes a 
reasonable period of detention. From the time that the scale was discovered, the investigation 
clearly changed in nature from a routine traffic stop conducted for purposes of enforcing the 
motor vehicle registration requirements, to an investigation into the possibility of drug crime 
encompassing not just the scale but also the vehicle in which the defendant was travelling. 
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Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 4491, 50 (1983); State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913,916 (Ct.App. 
2001); State v. Myers, 118 Idaho 608, 613 (Ct.App. 1990). The officers chose to run the dog 
around the car before having the dog sniff the scale, but could just as easily have proceeded in the 
opposite order, beginning with the scale and finishing with the car; the time involved would 
almost certainly have been the same, and either sequence would have been reasonable for 
purposes of investigating the possibility of ongoing drug offenses suggested by the presence of 
the scale and tlie surrounding circumstances discussed above. In short, the fortuity that the 
officers checked the exterior of the car first ( on which the dog did not alert), rather than the scale 
(on which it did), is not a valid basis for concluding that the investigation was unreasonably 
prolonged. Both checks were narrowly tailored to the purpose of the investigation, and 
minimally intrusive, particularly considering that the defendant consented to turn over the scale 
to officer Bonas, the K9 officer, when asked. The Court therefore finds that the duration of the 
detention was reasonable for the purposes of the investigation. 
E. THE FACT THAT THE SCALE LATER TESTED NEGATIVE FOR 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES DOES NOT INVALIDATE THE OFFICER'S 
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE. Although 
not raised in his original or supplemental brief filed in support of his motion, at the hearing the 
defendant repeatedly contended that the state's case was "fishy" because no drug residue was 
detected on the scale at the lab. The K9 officer addressed this issue in his testimony at the 
hearing, as did the United States Supreme Court in the recently-decided case of Florida v. 
Harris, 133 S.Ct. 1050 (2013). Regarding the phenomenon of a drug dog alerting on an object 
that later tests negative for narcotics, the Supreme Court wrote that "we do not evaluate probable 
cause in hindsight, based on what a search does or does not turn up." Id More specifically, and 
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consistent with the K.9 officer's testimony, the Supreme Court wrote that "[a] well-trained drug-
detection dog should alert to ... odors" indicating that proscribed substances were present on or 
near an object or area, even where there is not enough actual substance on the object to trigger a 
positive test at the lab. Id. In short, the dog detects odors, which in some cases may exist even 
where detectable substances no longer exist. Therefore, a negative test at the lab does not 
necessarily indicate a false positive from the dog; and, in any event, probable cause is not 
assessed in hindsight. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Bowman's motion to suppress is hereby DENIED in its 
entirety. 
-,,,. 
SO ORDERED and dated this~ day of October, 2013. 
. _Aµ.---
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